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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
vVHITNEY PARRY,

Plaiutiff and Appellant,

vs.
J. H. CROSBY, as Justice of the
Peace of Kanab Precinct, I\::ane
County, State of Utah, GEORGE
A. SwAPP, as Sheriff of Kane
County, State of Utah, and
DAVID L. PuGH, as County Attorney of Kane County, State
of Utah,

Defendants a11d Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

HARLEY W. GusTIN,

Attorney for Plaintiff
a(rul Appellant.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
\YHITNEY PARRY,

Pla·intiff amd Appellant,
vs.
J. H. CROSBY, as Justice of the
Peace of Kanab Precinct, Kane
County, State of Utah, GEORGE
A. SwAPP, as Sheriff of Kane
County, State of Utah, and
DAVID L. PuGH, as County Attorney of Kane County, State
of Utah,
Defendarnts and Respondents.

No. 6225

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
'nhls :appeal involves the constrUJC1tion of Section
103-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pertaining to

the seizure and destruction of alleged gambling pa-raphernalia.

The paraphernalia involved consists of so-

ealled ''slot ma;chines. ''

'The seizure and threatened

destruction ·o.f the machines and confiscation of money
contained therein is attacked primarily on the ground
that the seizure was without due process of law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On June 12, 19·39 four so-called slot machines were
taken from the possession of appellant at the Parry
Lodge in Kanab, Uta·h. At the time ·of the seizure of the
machines, respondent sheriff had initiated proceedings
in the Justice's Court, Kanab Precinct, Kane County
wherein the State of Utah appeared as plaintiff and
Whitney Parry, the appellant, was named as defendant.
The proceedings were commenced by the filing ·Of an affidavit for atta1chment signed by the sheriff and in which
affidavit he deposed "That he has reason to !believe and
does believe that the said Whitney Parry has in his place
of business certain Slot Machines which are being operated contrary to law." (Abs. p. 10; Tr. pp. 16-17) Upon
this affidavit the respondent Justice of the Peace issued
a writ ·Of attacJhment commanding the sheriff ''to attach
and safely keep any and all Slot Machines belonging to
the above named defendant (Parry) which may be found
in his place of business, known as the Parry Lodge ·in
Kanab, Kane County, State of Utah, until disposed of
by order of Court." (Abs. p. 11; Tr. p. 17). On the same
day, the respondent sheriff made his return on the writ
that he had attached ''four slot macJhines and that he was
holding the same to be disposed o.f by order of court.''
(Abs. p. 12; Tr. pp. 17-18)
On the 7th day of July, 1939 respondent Justice of
the Pea·ce issued a " Citation to Show Cause" in the ease
entitled in his court____;The State of Utah, plaintiff, vs.
Whitney Parry, defendant,-requiring Parry to show
1
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cause, if any he had, why the slot machines, which were
taken from him under writ ·O.f attachment issued by the
court, should not be destroyed and the money in them
forfeited to Kane County. (Abs. pp. 12-13; Tr. p. 18)
On the 26th day of July, 1939 and before any hearing
on the Citation to Show Cause, appellant filed in the District Co-urt of the Sixth Judicial District in and for Kane
County, State of lTtah his complaint against the respondents praying for injunctive relief. (Aihs. pp. 1-5; Tr. pp.
1-5) A temporary restraining order was issued by the
District Court (Abs. pp. 5..6; Tr. p. 5) and the matter
came on for hearing upon an order to show cause (Abs.
pp. 6-7; Tr. p. 9) ·On the 15th day of August, 19·39; the
issues being joined by an answer filed on behalf of the
respondents. (Abs. pp. 7-8 ; Tr. p. 11)
The gist of appellant's complaint in the District
Court was that the devices taken by respondents were
taken without due process of law or any legal proceeding
whatsoever and that the respondents threatened to destroy the devices and to confiscate money of undetermined amount to appellant's detriment. The answer admits the seizure of the four devices containing money
but alleges that the devices were taken by due process of
la.w '• and that said devices were gambling devi·ces and
were being operated by the said plaintiff and his agents
contrary to law.''
At the trial of the injunction suit Mr. Parry testified
that he was at the Parry Lodge on the night of June 12tih
when the machines involved were taken by the sheriff
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but that he was not served with any papers. (Abs. pp.
21-22; Tr. p. 38) At this time the Parry Lodge was definitely dosed to the public. A motion picture company
1had taken under lease all of the aocommoda.tions and
there was a sign on the front of the lodge to the effect
that the plajce was closed. The lodge was being operated
as a. private home would ibe under lease. (Abs. p. 22; Tr.
p. 29) Appellant testified, on cross examination, as t·o
a conversation with the sheriff on the night that the machines were taken. He testified that the sheriff said,
"We have come to get your slot maehines." The appellant said, ''By what authority are you taking· these slot
machines~'' To which the sheriff replied, '' \Ye have a
paper made out by the County Attorne~· and signed by
the Justice of the Peace." (Abs. p. 23; Tr. p. 43)
~~··,

T!he record is silent as to the use of the machines
on June 12th or at any other time except that it was
stipulated, subject to the objeetion that such testimony
would be irrelevant and immaterial, that a Mr. Luke,
a road patrolman, 'if called on the part of the defendants,
would testify that a day or so before the ma-chines involved were picked up that he saw the mruchines being
played "in tJhe ordinary way" at the Parry Lodg·e. (Abs.
p. 25; Tr. pp. 30, 35, 45)
The court thereafter ~made and entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (Abs. pp.
8-17; Tr. pp. 15-22) dis·solving, vacating and setting aside
the temporary restraining order theretofore issued and
dismissing appellant's action with costs to the respondSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ents. It is from that judgment that this appeal is proseeuted.
STATEMEN'l'S OF ERRORS RE-LIED UPON.
Ten a:Ssignments of error are urged. Cmnmon to all
of the assignments is the contention that the proceeding·
in the Justice's 0ourt should have been a proceeding i11
rem rath-er than a proceeding in personam to accomplish
what the respondents apparently intended to accomplish;
i.e., the destruction of the so-called slot machines and the
confiscation of the money in them.
The first assignment go·es to the testimony of the
witness Luke. Luke's testimony that ''a day or so'' before the machines were picked up he saw t:hem being
played "in the ordinary way" in the Parry Lodge could
only be relevant and material to justify the respondents
in taking some action in a proceeding in personam. The
proceeding in the Justice's 0ourt being not bas·ed upon
any crime allegedly committed by Parry, the testimony
was obviously irrelevant and immaterial as justification
for the seizure.
Assignments 2 and 3 attack the trial court's rulings
in admitting in ·evidence respondents' Exhilbits "A'' and
'·'B"-Exhibit "A" was the Affidavit for Attachment
and Exhibit "B" the Writ of Attachment-both entitled
in the Justi.ce's court with the State of Utah as plaintiff
and Whitney Parry as defendant.

These exhibits were
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objected to· upon the ground that they were incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial and that no proper foundation
had been laid for their admission, the theory of the respondents being that the exhibits justified or went to
justify the seizure of the machines.
Assignment No. 4 is self-explanatory.

By this as-

signment appellant challenges the pr·opriety of the trial
court's refusal to strike a portion of an answer of respondents' witness Chamberlain. The motion was made
on the ground that the portion of the answer referred
to was indefinite, vague, conjectural and otherwise incompetent.

When the witness said that the sheriff "ap-

parently" offered Exhibit "B'' to appellant or offered
it to him to read, the witness stated nothing but a conclusion.

His testimony did not rise to the dignity of a

sta:tem·ent of fa-ct.
Assignments 5, 6 and 7 g~n to speei:fi.c findings or portions of findings of fact adopted by the trial court and
are complained of on the ground that the portions indicated are not supported by but are contrary to the
evidence.
Assignments 8 and 9 are directed to· t~he conclusions
of law drawn by the trial court from the findings of fa.ct
and assignm-ent No. 10 attacks the judgment on the
ground that it is contrary to law and that the evidenee
is insufficient to sustain or justify the same in the particulars indicated by the assignment.
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STATEMENT OF PARTICULAR
QUES.TIONS INVOLVEU.

vVas

the proceeding in the J ustiee 's court sufficient
to give that court jurisdicti·on to seiz·e or to· order destruction of the so ...c.alled slot machines and the forfeiture
of the money contained in then1 to l(ane County'

ARGUMENT.
This court in the case of Utah Liquor Control Commission v. Wooras, (Utah) 93 Pac. (2d) 455, has reiterated many of the fundamental principles involved in this
appeal. The decision in the W ooras case constitutes a
terse, comprehensive and clear restatement of what constitutes due pr•ocess of law in aetions in personam as
well as in aetions in rem.
In the W ooras case two questions were presented
for determination. '' 1. Were the issues raised by the
pleadings such as to make relevant and material certain
testimony eXJcluded by the ·Court' 2. Were the pleadings
and the proceedings lhy which the property was seized
sufficient to vest the .court with power to order a confiscation of the property'" The statute under which the
Liquor Commission proceeded in the W oora.s case was
different in a number ·o.f particulars from the statute involv·ed in this .case but the fundamental principles are
the same.
In the ·case at bar, the respondents sought to invoke
the right of seizure of property and its destruction in
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an action in pers-onam and not in rem. The affidavit of
the sheriff, the initial proceeding .in the Justice's 1court,
was not sufficient for any purpose. It was not a complaint, a petition or an affidavit charging Parry with the
com·mission of a crime. Section 103-2:5-7, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, makes it a misdemeanor for a person
to keep or operate in :his place of business the device or
instrument enmmonly known as a ''slot machine'' for
gambling.

There is no averment in the affidavit made

by the sheriff ·that Parry kept such a device or machine
''for gambling.''

But in any event the other papers

signed, prepared and acted up-on by respondents indicate,
not the purpose to charge Parry with the commission
of a crime, but to obtain an order ·of destruction of property and which proceeding is ·essentially one in rem. We
quote from the W ooras case as follows:
''In libel actions f.or ·confiscation, where the
proceeding is essentially against the property as
such, the res itself must be brought before the
court by and through such process as the law has
decreed to place it within the power and control
of the court. ' '
If the respondents were attempting to act within the
purview of Secti·on 103.-25-1, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, the affidavit of ·the sheriff was wholly insufficient

as legal process not only beeause the affidavit referred
to Parry as an individual but also in that it lacked the
averment upon which such a seizure could be predicated.
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So far as is rna terial to the issues herein involved, the
section reads :

'' * * * it shall be the, duty of all '"
*
peaee officers whenever it shall .come to the
knowledge of such offieer that any person has in
his possession any * * '" slot machines *
* * used or kept for the purpose of playing for
money, or for tokens redeemable in money * *
* or that * "' * slot machines * '" *
used or kept for the purpose aforesaid Inay be
found in anr place, to seize and take such * *
* slot machines and convey the same bef.oTe a
magistrate of the co·unty in whic,h such devices
shall be found; * * * ''
There is nothing in the affidavit, respondents' Exhibit "A'', which indicates that the offending slot machines were used or kept for the purpose of playing for
money or for tokens redeemable in money and it is upon
that ground only that the machines, if properly proceeded
against, can be seized.
The respondents in the Justice's court, whether the
action be termed one in personam or in rem, apparently
proceeded ·on the theory that a so-called slot machine,
regardless of its use, was contraband and subject to
seizure. In the W ooras case, supra, Justice Pratt in his
eoncurring decision stated:
''I ·Concur but wish to add this : If the property seized has but ·one use and that an illegal one,
no one may claim it, as no one has a property right
in an illegal thing-under such circumstances the
invalidity .of the process of seizure is immaterial.
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If any of the property seized in this case is of that
class, then it should not be returned.''
There is nothing in the ,case at bar to indicate that
the ma,chines seized by respondents had but one use, towit, an illegal use and there is nothing in the record to.
indicate that the ·machines, if used for any purpose, were
''used or kept for the purpose of playing for money, or
for tokens redeemable in money.'' Respondents in their
pro-ceeding in the Justice's court apparently took the
position that a slot machine described as such, lby name
only, and regardless of its use was per se an illegal thing
in which there was no property right-such is not the
law.
The case of Lee v. City of Mia,mi, 163 So. 486
Florida), is a case that is extensively annotated on the
particular subj.ect as to whether ·or not a slot machine is
per se contraband in 101 A. L. R. 112.6. The first headnote of the A. L. R. on page 1115 is as follows:
(

1

"Ooin-operated vending machines Virith premium features which may or may not vend for
ea;ch ·coin deposited an article of merchandis·e,
coin-operated skill machines which may or may
not pay a reward for skillful operation, and trade
machines giving to patrons at intervals the right
to receive premiums, are not lotteries per se, so
that a statute licensing and regulating the same
does not conflict Virith a constitutional provision
prohibiting lotteries.''

By reason of the comprehensive annotation on the
general sulbjHct, we have refrained from picking out inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dividual or isolated cases. The annotation itself will
give the court a lead to many appropriate cases without
reiteration on our part.
Where a thing can be used for a purpos·e other th·an
an illegal one, it must ·be proceeded against with the same
formality and subject to the same due process of law
as in the case ·of individuals. This ·elemental proposition
is very ably stated by this court in the Woora.s case,
speaking through J ustiee Larson:
'' The jurisdiction of the courts to condemn or
forfeit property is dependent upon statute, and
the prescribed procedure is in general regarded
as e~elusive and in a sense jurisdictional. United
States v. Franzione, 286 F. 769, 52 App. D. C. 307.
All these proceedings are ·Civil in their nature, and
the res is proceeded against as a thing guilty, and
is a party to the action. Other parties asserting
an interest in the property which they wish to defend, may come into the a.ction, s·et up their rights
and have them determined.''
In the case at bar and in a proceeding against the
machines, they are the guilty thing; it was not sufficient
to merely describe the machines as slot machines bu:t it
was necessary for them to allege they were ''used or
kept for the purpose of playing f.or money, or for tokens
redeemable in money.''
That this averment by complaint, petition or affidavit is essential becomes even mor·e clear when considering the last portion of ·Section 103-25-1 where it is
declared that ''if such magistrate shall determine that
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the same are used or kept f.or the purpose o.f being used
at any game or games of :chance des.cribed in this chapter,
it shall be his duty to destroy the same." In other words,
the magistrate cannot order a confis·cation of the property unless he finds that the property was used or kept
f.or the purpose of being used as a game of .chance. By
the mere use ·Of the generic term "slot machines" no
court, sheriff, county attorney is ·entitled to seize the
machines ·without attaching to them the element of
gambling; without that averment the thing proceeded
against is guilty of no crime. The element of gambling
must he present to. charge an individual with a crime
under Chapter 25 of Title 103, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, and when paraphernalia is sought to be seized and
destroyed it must be shown that not only the element of
gambling exists but also that the machine or parapihernalia itself was us·ed or kept for the purpose o.f playing
f.or money or for tokens redeemable in money.
For the reasons stated, the evidence sought to be
excluded and the t.estim·ony sought to be stricken was irrelevant and immaterial.
In the W ooras case it is said:
''It is elemental that before a court can lawfully determine any rights it must not only be_ a
court empowered by law to determine such rights,
but it must have acquired jurisdiction or control
over the subject of the parUcular action, and of
the parties thereto, by and in the methods recognized or prescribed by law. It acquires its jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he ·comes into court
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iJn~oking·

its action. It a.cquires jurisdiction of
the subject of the particular aetion by the filing
of t;he sufficient complaint ·Or other proper pleading or petition. And it acquires jurisdiction of
the defendant or party other than plaintiff by the
lawful servir·e upon it of proper legal process or
by its voluntary appearance in the action and
submissi·on to the court's jurisdiction over it.''

In the case at bar all fundmnentals of procedure
were ignored by the respondents. The .statements of
this court in the \V.ooras ease are not statements o.f newly
discovered principles but are of basic reiterations and
fundamental propositions in a most erudite and concise
manner. The law as it now stands s:hould, in our opinion,
resolve the issues in fav.or of the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,

W. GusTIN,
Attonz,ey for Plaintiff
atnd Appellant.

HARLEY

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

